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Abstract
In this paper we model an OLG economy à la Kiyotaki and Moore whose
novel feature is the role of money as a store of value and of bequest as a source
of funds to be invested in landholding. The dynamics generated by the
model are generally characterized by irregular cyclical trajectories and, under
special conguration of the parameters, a strange attractor appears. In this
setting, an expansionary monetary policy may have a stabilizing role due to
the interaction between money holding and the accumulation of borrowers
net worth.
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1 Introduction
According to the traditional view of the monetary transmission mechanism,
in the long run an increase in the growth rate of money supply translates
into an increase in ination which has no real e¤ects under the assumptions
of perfect capital markets, dynastic households and lump-sum taxes. A large
empirical literature has shown, on the contrary, that the ination rate could
a¤ect real activity leading to an increase in savings, output or the capital
stock (Loayza et al. 2000, Bullard and Keating, 1995, Khan et al., 2001).
An intuitive but controversial explanation of this fact is the Tobin-Mundell
e¤ect: in a simplied economy in which money and capital are substitutes
in householdsportfolio, an increase of the ination rate lowers the rate of
return on money and yields a shift away from money and towards greater
holdings of productive capital. Recently, di¤erent explanations of monetary
non neutrality in a more realistic setting have been put forward: the long
run real e¤ects of monetary policy are traced back to the redistribution of
seigniorage rents across households (Grandmont and Younès,1973, Kehoe et
al., 1992) or across generations (Weiss, 1980 ; Weil, 1991). The long run real
e¤ects of ination have been d tected also in models with nancial market
imperfections. Boyd and Smith (1998) study this issue in a setting of multiple
equilibria. Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) focus on the persistence of monetary
policy shocks in a framework with credit constraints. Ragot (2006) explores
the relation between the severity of credit constraints and long run ination
in a monetary growth model.
The present paper can be classied, for the sake of simplicity, in this
body of literature. We explore, however, a new channel of monetary non
neutrality in the presence of nancial frictions. When agents face a borrowing
constraint, a redistribution of real assets can occur due to the interaction
between net worth and ination. In other words a change in the growth rate
of money supply can a¤ect real output through the impact of ination on
borrowersnet worth.
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In order to analyze this channel we develop an overlapping generation
version of a Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) economy (KM hereafter). To the
best of our knowledge, no other attempt has been made to develop an OLG
framework of a KM economy with the exception of Kasa (1998) who presents
an OLG variant of the KM model in a Blanchard-Yaari nite horizon
framework (Blanchard, 1985).
We model an OLG-KM economy à la Diamond-Samuelson with money
and bequest. We assume that real money balances yield liquidity services
and enter the utility function (a standard assumption since Weiss, 1980). In
our framework money is essentially a store of value, which allows increased
consumption and bequest when old.
The endogenous dynamics generated by the OLG-KM model are much
richer than those of the original framework. In the present model, in fact,
trajectories can converge to a steady state or to periodic or aperiodic cyclical
patterns, i.e. to credit cycles properly speaking, and eventually, under spe-
cic parameter constellation, a strange attractor emerges. Strictly speaking
the original KMmodel generates credit uctuations (i.e. uctuations sparked
by a productivity shock and propagated by the impact of asset price changes
on the availability of credit) instead of credit cycles (i.e. endogenously de-
termined oscillating behavior).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic features
and the behavioral assumption of our OLG-KM economy. The analytical
details of the optimization problems are conned in the appendix. Section
3 is devoted to an analysis of the resource constraint and money ows. In
Section 4 we discuss the dynamics of the model. Section 5 is devoted to a
comparison with the baseline KM framework. Section 6 concludes.
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2 An OLG-KM Economy
In an OLG-KM economy, four classes of agents coexist at each point in time.
In order to simplify matters, we normalize the population in each class to
unity so that we will deal in the following with a young farmer (YF), an old
farmer (OF), a young gatherer (YG) and an old gatherer (OG).
There are two types of good, output (fruit) denoted by y and a
non-reproducible asset (land)  denoted by K  whose total supply is
xed ( K). Following KM we assume that output is produced by means of a
technology which uses land and labour and yields output with a one period
lag. Due to the particular timing of an OLG economy, it is straightforward
to assume therefore that each agent applies labour to production when young
and obtains the fruit of this e¤ort when old.
Each young agent is endowed with one unit of labour. By assumption
farmers and gatherers have access to di¤erent technologies. The production
function of the YF is yFt = K
F
t 1,  > 0, while the production function of
the YG is yGt = G
 
KGt 1

. Function G(:) is increasing and strictly concave in
its argument, and satises the usual Inada conditions. Due to the time lag
between cultivation and production, the agents work when young and obtain
fruit when old.
For the sake of simplicity we assume that young agents postpone con-
sumption. Moreover, they leave a bequest to the o¤spring when old. As
usual the bequest motive is rooted in intergenerational altruism. We assume
also that money provides specic utility to the young agent. The generic
utility function therefore is:
U i = U
 
cit;t+1; a
i
t+1;m
i
t;t

i = F;G;
where cit;t+1 is consumption of the agent of type i and generation t in t+1 (the
old agent), ait+1 is bequest left by the same agent to his/her child,m
i
t;t :=
M it;t
Pt
are real money balances of the agent of type i and generation t in t (the young
4
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agent).
2.1 The Farmer/Borrower
The farmer maximizes UF = u
 
cFt+1; a
F
t+1;m
F
t;t

subject to three constraints:
the ow-of-funds constraint when young, the ow-of-funds constraint when
old and the nancing constraint.
The ow-of-funds constraint of the young farmer in t (in real terms) is:
qt
 
KFt  KFt 1

+mFt;t  bt + aFt ; (1)
where qt :=
Qt
Pt
is the real price of land; mFt;t =
MFt;t
Pt
are the YFs real money
balances, bt is credit and aFt is bequest, i.e. wealth inherited by the YF.
According to (1), the resources of the YF, of internal or external origin (aFt
and bt respectively), can be employed to invest qt
 
KFt  KFt 1

i.e. to
change the farmers landholding and accumulate money balances mFt;t.
Since the young does not derive utility from consumption, the YF carries
money over from youth to old age in order to use it as a means of payment
in the second stage of his life. Notice that the old agent can consume (and
leave as a bequest) the output obtained from working when young  net
of interest payments to the gatherer because it takes one period for land
to bear fruit. Strictly speaking money is not absolutely necessary to make
consumption possible when old. Money only allows to increase consumption
(and bequest) when old over and above the level made possible by production
alone.
The YF borrows from the YG. Being endowed with inalienable human
capital, the former can get a loan equal at most to the value of collateralizable
assets, i.e. the future value of the land he/she is currently owning. The
nancing constraint can be expressed as:
bt  qt+1
R
KFt ; (2)
5
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where R is the real (gross) interest rate and qt+1 is the real price of land in
the future which we assume is known in advance (perfect foresight).
In period t, the young farmer uses labour and land KFt to produce output
which will become available in t + 1. When old, the farmers resources eFt+1
consist of output yFt+1 = K
F
t and real money balances m
F
t;t+1 =
MFt;t+1
Pt+1
less
debt service Rbt i.e. eFt+1 = K
F
t + m
F
t;t+1   Rbt. These resources can be
employed to consume and leave a bequest:
cFt;t+1 + a
F
t+1 +Rbt  KFt +mFt;t+1: (3)
We conceive of money injections as monetized transfers from the public
sector to the old agents. Therefore nominal money balances of the farmer
when old MFt;t+1 are equal to the sum of money carried on from youth M
F
t;t
and of subsidies T Ft+1. Moreover, we assume that these transfers are pro-
portional to money balances in youth, i.e. T Ft+1 = gMM
F
t;t. Hence M
F
t;t+1 =
MFt;t (1 + gM), where gM is the rate of growth of money supply. It is straight-
forward to conclude that real money balances when old are:
mFt;t+1 = m
F
t;t (1 + gM) t+1;
where t+1 :=
Pt
Pt+1
is the real return on money.1
From the FOCs of the optimization problem we conclude that the nanc-
ing constraint will be binding if the following condition holds true:
um > ucR; (4)
where um =
@u
@mFt;t
and uc =
@u
@cFt;t+1
are the marginal utilities of money and
1Of course t+1 =
1
1 + t+1
, where t+1 is the ination rate.
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consumption (when old).2
Suppose the young farmer obtains a new loan consisting of one unit of
fruit and increases money holding in period t by the same amount.3 In our
setting additional money yields an increase in utility both in youth and in
old age. This e¤ect is captured by the um term. Hence the LHS of (4) is
the total increase in utility due to an increase in money holding by one unit
when the farmer is young.
Then, the farmer has to pay back R > 1 units of fruit to the gatherer. The
marginal utility of future consumption the old farmer should give up therefore
is
@u
@cFt;t+1
@cFt;t+1
@bt
= ucR. Inequality (4) states that the nancing constraint is
binding if the marginal utility um the farmer obtains from increasing money
holding by one unit as a consequence of increasing debt by the same amount
when young is greater than the marginal utility of consumption ucR the
farmer should give up because he has to reimburse debt when old. In this
case the farmer has an incentive to get as much debt as he can.
Notice that from (4) if there were no e¤ect on utility of money holding
when young, i.e. um = 0, the condition for a binding nancing constraint
would never be satised because ucR > 0. A necessary condition for money
to be held in portfolios by rational farmers when young, therefore, is um > 0.
This is the reason why money shows up in the utility function. Thanks to
this feature we can incorporate our framework in to the class of OLG models
with Money in the Utility Function (Weiss, 1980).
When the constraints turn out to be binding, as we will assume, by sub-
stituting (2) into (1) and rearranging one gets:
tK
F
t = a
F
t + qtK
F
t 1  mFt;t; (5)
2The marginal utility of bequest ua =
@u
@aFt+1
is equal to the marginal utility of con-
sumption.
3By assumption consumption when young does not yield utility. Therefore, the addi-
tional loan is not consumed.
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where t = qt  
qt+1
R
is the downpayment, i.e. the internal funds the YF
must provide (together with external funds, i.e. the loan extended by the
YG) to purchase land. The RHS of equation (5) represents the farmers net
worth  consisting of bequest and the market value of land net of money
balances. According to (5) the farmer accumulates net worth to provide the
downpayment necessary to increase his landholding.
If the YF did not hold money, he could accumulate more net worth,
provide a higher downpayment and obtain more land. Money holdings exert
a crowding out e¤ect on investment in land.
Substituting (2) into (3) and rearranging one gets:
cFt;t+1 + a
F
t+1 = (  qt+1)KFt +mFt;t+1: (6)
Money carried over from young age increases resources of the old farmer.
The e¤ort to put aside money when young pays o¤ in old age because it adds
resources to those already available to the old for consumption and bequest.
The RHS of (6), i.e. (  qt+1)KFt +mFt;t+1 is the equation of the resources
of the old (eFt+1).
4
For simplicity we assume that the utility function is separable and adopt
a Cobb-Douglas specication for consumption and bequest and a linear spec-
ication for money in the utility function:
UF =  ln cFt;t+1 + (1  ) ln aFt+1 + FmFt;t ; (7)
where 0 <  < 1, F > 0. The farmer maximizes (7) subject to (1), (2) and
(3). It turns out that for the optimal solution all constraints are binding (see
the appendix).
From the FOCs and the constraints it is easy to conclude that, due to
4We impose
KFt +m
F
t;t+1 > qt+1K
F
t
to assure non negativity of eFt+1:
8
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the Cobb-Douglas specication of preferences, consumption and bequest are
a fraction  and 1   respectively of the resources available in t + 1 to the
OF: cFt;t+1 = e
F
t+1 and a
F
t+1 = (1  ) eFt+1. Hence:
cFt;t+1 = 

(  qt+1)KFt +mFt;t+1

; (8)
aFt+1 = (1  )

(  qt+1)KFt +mFt;t+1

: (9)
Moreover um = F and uc =

cFt;t+1
=
1
eFt+1
since cFt+1 = e
F
t+1 . Hence (4)
specializes to:
F >
R
eFt+1
:
In words, the (constant) marginal utility of money should be greater than a
threshold level which in turn is a function, among other things, of the price
of land, the farmers landholding and the old farmers money balances (see
appendix for details).
From (9) it follows that the optimal bequest of the OF of generation t 1
in t is:
aFt = (1  )

(  qt)KFt 1 +mFt 1;t

;
where mFt 1;t =
MFt 1;t
Pt
are real money balances of the OF of generation t  1
in t. After substituting this expression in (5) one gets:
tK
F
t = [(1  )+ qt]KFt 1 + (1  )mFt 1;t  mFt;t ; (10)
which is the law of motion of the land of the farmer.
The RHS of (10) represents the YFs net worth, which turns out to depend
on total output KFt 1, on the market value of land qtK
F
t 1
5and on money
5Due to the nancing constraint, the market value of land is equal to debt service
qtK
F
t 1 = Rbt 1. The higher the market value, therefore, the higher will be the interest
payments for the OF and the lower resources and bequest. This e¤ect, albeit only indirect,
is detrimental for the YFs net worth. On the other hand, by denition, the market value
of inherited landholding directly a¤ects the YFs net worth. This latter e¤ect more than
9
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balances mFt 1;t and m
F
t;t. Money has two di¤erent and contrasting e¤ects on
net worth (and therefore on landholding):
1. given the bequest, the higher is money of the young mFt;t, the lower net
worth and landholding. In fact resources of the young (bequest and
credit) can be devoted either to money or landholding;
2. the higher is money of the old mFt 1;t, the higher resources available
to him and the higher the bequest the old leaves to the young. This
bequest, in turn, is a component of net worth which can be employed
by the young to expand landholding.
At this stage of the analysis, it is not clear which e¤ect prevails. In the
following (see section 3) we will derive a condition which must be satised
for the negative e¤ect (#1) to prevail over the positive e¤ect (#2).
2.2 The Gatherer/Lender
Being unconstrained from a nancial point of view, the gatherer maximizes
UG = u
 
cGt+1; a
G
t+1;m
G
t;t

subject to the sole sequence of ow of funds con-
straints. The ow of funds constraint of the young gatherer in t reads as:
mGt;t + bt + qt
 
KGt  KGt 1
  aGt : (11)
According to (11), the resources of the YG, which coincide with bequest (aGt ),
can be employed to invest, qt
 
KGt  KGt 1

, extend credit and hold money
balances. If the YG did not put aside some money in order to employ it in
the future i.e. to increase his resources when old he could invest more in
land or lend more.
o¤sets the former one so that in the end the market value of land turns out to be a positive
component of the YFs net worth, with a weight  smaller than one.
10
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In t, the YG uses labour and land KGt to produce output which will
become available in t + 1: yGt+1 = G
 
KGt

. When old, the gatherers re-
sources consist of output (produced when young), interest payments received
from the farmer and money balances: eGt+1 = G
 
KGt

+ Rbt +m
G
t;t+1. These
resources can be employed to consume and leave a bequest. We assume,
however, that part of the money carried over from youth CMFGt = 'M
G
t;t,
0 < ' < 1 is kept as a bu¤er stock to carry on the lending business
smoothly. The gatherer, in fact, in this context (as in KM) plays the
role of the lender. We can think of ' as a policy parameter, possibly estab-
lished by the central bank in his role of regulator/supervisor of the banking
system or as a rough measure of transaction cost due to nancial frictions.
Therefore the ow of funds constraint of the OG in t+1 in real terms is:
cGt;t+1 + a
G
t+1 + CMF
G
t  G
 
KGt

+Rbt +m
G
t;t+1: (12)
From the FOCs one gets:
G0
 
KGt

R
= qt: (13)
The interpretation of (13) is as follows. Suppose the young gatherer
sells one unit of land in t at the price qt. The young farmers landholding
increases by one unit so that the loan the gatherer extends to the farmer goes
up by qt+1=R. All in all, the increase of resources available to the gatherer
when young is equal to qt   (qt+1=R) = t, i.e. the downpayment. The
marginal impact of this increase of resources in t on the gatherers utility is
ucR [qt   (qt+1=R)] = uc (Rqt   qt+1).
The reduction in the gatherers landholding in t translates into a loss of
output G0
 
KGt

in t+ 1. The loan made in t yields interest payments equal
to R (qt+1=R) = qt+1. Therefore, selling one unit of land in t leads to a
reduction of resources in t+1 equal to G0
 
KGt
  qt+1. The marginal impact
of this decrease of resources in t+ 1 on utility is uc

G0
 
KGt
  qt+1. In the
optimum uc (Rqt   qt+1) = uc

G0
 
KGt
  qt+1. From this condition we get
11
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(13).
In order to save on notation, recalling that KGt = K   KFt , we write
G0
 
K  KFt

= g
 
KFt

, where g0 =  G00 > 0. Therefore we can re-write
(13) as:
qt =
g
 
KFt

R
: (14)
In the following we will refer to (14) as the asset price equation.
Following the same modelling strategy of the previous section, we assume
that preferences of the gatherer are represented by:
UG =  ln cGt;t+1 + (1  ) ln aGt+1 + GmGt;t: (15)
The gatherer maximizes UG subject to (11) and (12). All the constraints
turn out to be binding (see the Appendix for further details).
Since the nancing constraint is binding, the amount of credit extended
by the YG in t is bt =
qt+1
R
KFt . Therefore the resources of the old gatherer
are eGt+1 = G
 
KGt

+ qt+1K
F
t +m
G
t;t+1   'mGt;tt+1. Using the FOCs and the
constraints it is easy to conclude that consumption and bequest are a fraction
 and 1   respectively of the resources available to the OG: cGt;t+1 = eGt+1,
aGt+1 = (1  ) eGt+1. Recalling that mGt;t+1 = mGt;t (1 + gM) t+1 we get:
cGt;t+1 = 

G
 
KGt

+ qt+1K
F
t +m
G
t;t+1   'mGt;tt+1

; (16)
aGt+1 = (1  )

G
 
KGt

+ qt+1K
F
t +m
G
t;t+1   'mGt;tt+1

: (17)
3 Resource Constraints and Money Flows
Since the total amount of land is xed, an increase in landholding for the
farmer can occur only if there is a corresponding decrease in landholding for
the gatherer: KFt  KFt 1 =  
 
KGt  KGt 1

. Taking this fact into account,
summing side by side the ow of funds constraints of the young and the old
12
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agents (1), (11), (3) and (12) yields the aggregate resource constraint in t+1:
cFt;t+1+ c
G
t;t+1+m
F
t+1;t+1+m
G
t+1;t+1 = y
F
t+1+ y
G
t+1+m
G
t;t+1+m
F
t;t+1 'mGt;tt+1;
(18)
where yFt+1 = K
F
t and y
G
t+1 = G
 
KGt

. In words: the sum of aggregate
output and real money balances of the old agents is equal to the sum of
aggregate consumption of the old agents and real money balances of the
young agents.
We assume equilibrium on the goods market, i.e.
cFt;t+1 + c
G
t;t+1 = y
F
t+1 + y
G
t+1: (19)
Taking (19) into account, (18) boils down to:
mFt+1;t+1 +m
G
t+1;t+1 = m
F
t;t+1 +m
G
t;t+1   'mGt;tt+1; (20)
i.e. the total amount of real money balances of the young agents is equal to
the total amount of real money balances of the old agents.
In our economy money trickles downfrom one period to the next and
from one agent to the other. In order to describe the way in which money
ows in the economy, lets assume that yFt+1   cFt;t+1 = sFt;t+1 > 0, i.e. the OF
consumes less than the output he has produced. In a sense he is saving
the amount sFt;t+1. Market clearing on the goods market implies s
G
t;t+1 =
   cGt;t+1   yGt+1 =  sFt;t+1 < 0 i.e. the OG consumes more than the output
he has produced. He is dissavingthe amount
 
cGt;t+1   yGt+1

.
The OF sells sFt;t+1 units of output to the OG in order to let him con-
sume in excess of his output. The OG pays this output by means of money.
Therefore, after the transaction, the OF has money balances equal tomFt;t+1+ 
cGt;t+1   yGt+1

. This money is used to reimburse debt btR to the OG and leave
the bequest aFt+1 to the YF. The YF receives a
F
t+1 from OF and bt+1 from
the YG and employs these resources to invest, qt+1
 
KFt+1  KFt

and hold
13
Page 14 of 35
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
money balances.
Thanks to the Cobb-Douglas specication of the utility function, from
the FOCs (see the Appendix) one gets:
ait+1 =
1  

cit;t+1 i = F;G: (21)
Assuming that  :=
mGt;t
mFt;t
(i.e. the ratio of money of the gatherer to money
of the farmer of the same generation is constant) and recalling that mFt;t+1 =
mFt (1 + gM) t+1 we get:
mFt+1;t+1 =
[(1 + gM) (1 + )  '] t+1
1 + 
mFt;t :
After adjusting the time index and recalling thatmFt 1;t = m
F
t 1;t 1 (1 + gM) t
it is trivial to obtain the following relation between real money balances of
the old farmer and of the young farmer:
mFt 1;t =
(1 + ) (1 + gM)
[(1 + gM) (1 + )  ']m
F
t;t : (22)
Substituting (22) in (10) the expression (1  )mFt 1;t mFt;t which shows up
in (10) boils down to  AmFt with:
A =
(1 + ) (1 + gM)    '
(1 + ) (1 + gM)  ' : (23)
We can plausibly assume that the cost parameter '; albeit positive, is
smaller than one. We can also safely assume that 0 <  < 1: These are su¢ -
cient conditions for the denominator of the expression above to be positive.
As a consequence, A is positive if:
(1 + ) (1 + gM)  > ';
14
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i.e. if the preference parameter  is higher than a threshold  = '= (1 + ) (1 + gM).
If this is the case, the negative e¤ect of money holding on the farmers net
worth prevails over the positive one (see the end of section 2.1) and mon-
eyholding act as a brake on investment in land. In the following we will
consider only this scenario.
Therefore (10) simplies to:
KFt =
[(1  )+ qt]KFt 1   AmFt
t
: (24)
Substituting (8) and (16) into the market clearing condition (19) we ob-
tain:
mGt;t+1 +m
F
t;t+1   'mGt;tt+1 =
1  

 
yGt+1 + y
F
t+1

: (25)
Equation (25) is the quantity theory of money in this context. Recalling
equation (20) and that we have assumed  :=
mGt;t
mFt;t
after substitutions and
adjusting the time index (25) becomes:
mFt;t =
1  

1
1 + 
 
yFt + y
G
t

: (26)
4 Dynamics
The dynamics of the macroeconomy are described by equation (24), i.e. the
law of motion of the farmers land, equation (14), i.e. the asset price equation,
and equation (26), i.e. the quantity theory of money.
We list the equations below for the readers convenience:8>>>>><>>>>>:
KFt =
[(1  )+ qt]KFt 1   AmFt;t
t
;
qt =
g
 
KFt

R
;
mFt;t =
1  

1
1 + 

KFt 1 +G
 
K  KFt 1

:
(27)
15
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Plugging the third equation into the rst one and recalling that t =
qt   qt+1
R
;the law of motion of the farmers land becomes:
KFt =

(1  )

1  A
(1 + ) 

+ qt

KFt 1   (1  )
A
(1 + ) 
G
 
K  KFt 1

qt   qt+1
R
:
(28)
The dimensionality of the system can be reduced, for instance, substitut-
ing the asset price equation into (28) and noting that qt+1 =
g
 
KFt+1

R
: In
this case the system boils down to:
0 =
"
g
 
KFt

R
  g
 
KFt+1

R2
#
KFt  

(1  )

1  A
(1 + ) 

+ (29)
+
g
 
KFt

R
)
KFt 1 + (1  )
A
(1 + ) 
G
 
K  KFt 1

;
i.e. a second order di¤erence equation in implicit form which describes the
motion of the farmers landholding. The state of the variable in t+ 1, KFt+1,
is linked to the state of the same variable in t and t   1 in a complicated
non-linear way.6
From the second equation in (27), it is clear that also the asset price in
t+ 1, qt+1, is linked to KFt and K
F
t 1 in a non-linear way.
In the present contextA is the policy parameter, which can be modied by
the central bank by means of a change of the growth rate of the money supply.
From (23) it is immediate to compute
@A
@gM
=
(1 + ) (1  )'
[(1 + ) (1 + )  ']2 > 0 .
In the steady state KFt = K
F
t 1 = K
F and qt = qt+1 = q so that t =  =
q" where " := 1   1
R
. Moreover t+1 =  = gM so that (1 + gM) t+1 = 1
6Nevertheless, due to the assumptions on the production function, it is immediate to
observe that KFt+1 is uniquely dened by (29), being g(:) an increasing function.
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and A =
(1 + ) (1 + )    '
(1 + ) (1 + )  ' . In the steady state the bivariate system
composed by (14) and (28) boils down to:
q = 

h
 
KF
  1

+ 1

; (30)
q =
g
 
KF

R
: (31)
where:
 =
A
(1 + ") 
;
 =
(1  )
   " ;
h
 
KF

=
G
 
K  KF 
KF
;
and h0
 
KF

< 0. Equation (30) represents the isocline of the law of motion
of the farmers land while (31) is the isocline of the asset price equation.
Conditions (30) and (31) determine a system of two equations which can
be solved for the steady state values of KFand q. Moreover, (31) yields an
increasing relationship between q and KF on the
 
KF ; q

plane. From (30)
it is clear that the corresponding isocline can be either upward sloping or
downward sloping on the
 
KF ; q

plane depending upon the relative value of
 and ". In any case, it crosses the x-axis when
1

+ 1 = h
 
KF

; i.e. when
KF reaches a threshold KFc = h
 1 (). In the following we will assume  > "
7 which seems more plausible on empirical grounds, so that  > 0 and the
curve is downward sloping. Since viability requires that q > 0, we restrict
the analysis to h
 
KF
   > 0, i.e. KF < KFc .
The system is characterized by 7 parameters: the total endowment of land
7 > " implies R <
1
1   : Assuming that the real interest rate is equal to 1-2%, this
condition is satised for a large interval of :
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K, the productivity of the farmers land , the preference parameter , the
real interest rate R; the money allocation parameter , the cost parameter
', the policy parameter A.
In order to explore the forward dynamics in (27), we consider as phase
variables the asset price qt and the farmers land, lagged one-period KFt 1.
Moreover, we specify the gatherers production function as G
 
K  KFt

=p
K  KFt . It follows that the dynamics of the macroeconomy are described
by the two-dimensional map:
T :
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
KFt = K  
1
4R2q2t
qt+1 = R
2664qt  

(1  )

1  A
(1 + ) 

+ qt

KFt 1   (1  )
A
(1 + ) 
q
K  KFt 1
K   1
4R2q2t
3775
(32)
The rst equation of the T map comes from qt =
g
 
KFt

R
= 1=2R
p
K  KFt :The
second equation can be obtained by rearranging (28). The dynamics gener-
ated by (32) implies quite complex nonlinear relations between the two phase
variables, involving square root and rational functions. Any analytical ap-
proach to the study of its local and global bifurcations appears a hard task,
and is beyond the aim of the present paper. We proceed by numerical simu-
lations, leaving to further studies a more accurate analysis.
Depending upon the conguration of parameters, di¤erent dynamic pat-
terns can occur. In order to assess the properties of the trajectories generated
by (27) we simulate the dynamic system and compute the basin of attractions
of the xed points of the map.
In Figure 1 we represent the phase space
 
KFt ; qt

when the parameter
conguration is the following: K = 10,  = 1:5,  = 0:42, R = 1:02,
 = 0:022, ' = 0:47 and gM = 0:02. In this scenario, therefore, money growth
is rather low (2%). Steady state ination therefore would be correspondingly
low.
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Figure 1: Phase space
 
KFt ; qt

. Parameter conguration: K = 10,  = 1:5,
 = 0:42, R = 1:02,  = 0:022, gM = 0:02.
Given the above parameter conguration, there exist three points of the
map T described in in (32), but only one of them (F  ' (6:9135; 0:279))
belongs to the positive ortant of the phase-space. This steady state is a
repelling focus. Trajectories starting close to it converge to a closed invariant
curve  , which is generated by a supercritical Neimark-Sacker bifurcation of
F  when gM  0:0392 as shown in Figure 2 panel (b). Quasi periodic or
aperiodic orbits emerge when the system jumpsfrom one point to another
located on the curve. All the points, however, are bound to be visited by
trajectories located on the curve. The attracting closed curve   coexists
with a stable cycle of period 5, having periodic points fA;B;C;D;Eg (see
19
Page 20 of 35
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Figure 1) The basins of attraction of the two attractors (white and light
grey points) are separated by the stable set of a saddle cycle of period 5,
appeared with the stable one, via a saddle-node bifurcation occurring when
gM  0:09 (see Figure 2 panel (a)). The evolution of the state variables
along the trajectory is clockwise. Finally, the dark grey points are the basin
of attraction of divergent trajectories or trajectories characterized by negative
(and therefore unfeasible) asset price and/or landholding.
The reason why an oscillating (of a periodic or aperiodic nature) behavior
occurs can be explained as follows:
 When the economy jumps from point E to point A on the 5-period
cycle or from one point to another belonging to the increasing upper
portion of the   curve, both the asset price and the farmers landhold-
ing increase. This is due to the fact that net worth is going up, making
room for investment in land. As time goes by, the increase in land-
holding leads also to an increase in real money balances see the third
equation in (27) so that net worth slows down.
 From point A to point B on the 5-period cycle or from one point to
another of the decreasing upper portion of the   curve, the asset price
starts falling abruptly while the farmer is still increasing his landholding
but at a much slower pace.
 Eventually the farmers landholding starts decreasing. From point B
to point D on the 5-period cycle or from one point to another of the
increasing lower portion of the   curve, both the asset price and the
farmers landholding are going down. Net worth is therefore decreasing.
 As time goes by, the reduction in landholding leads also to a reduction
in real money balances so that net worth speeds up. From point D
to point E on the 5-period cycle or from one point to another of the
decreasing lower portion of the   curve, the asset price goes up while
the farmers landholding is still going down.
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What happens when the rate of growth of money supply goes up? In
Figure 2 panel (a) we have represented the evolution of the 5-period cycle
of the asset price as a function of the rate of growth of the money supply
keeping the same parameter setting as in Figure 1. The bifurcation diagram
has been obtained with initial condition (9:39; 0:42).
The amplitude of the cycle is clearly decreasing with the money growth
rate. When the rate of growth of money supply reaches a threshold (around
9%) the period 5 cycle disappears, as a consequence of a saddle-node bi-
furcation, and the considered trajectory converges to the steady state. The
relation of the 5-period cycle of the farmers land to the money growth rate
(not reported) follows a qualitatively similar pattern.
Figure 2: Bifurcation diagram. (a): 5 period cycle; (b):   curve
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In Figure 2 panel (b) (obtained with initial conditions 6:3, 0:27) we have
represented the evolution of the trajectories on the   curve of the asset price
as a function of the rate of growth of the money supply. The maximum
amplitude of the oscillations is clearly decreasing with the money growth
rate. When the rate of growth of money supply reaches a critical value close
to 4% the steady state becomes stable, due to the occurring (in reverse way)
supecritical Neimark-Sacker bifurcation.
In other words, an expansionary monetary policy has a stabilizing e¤ect.
The increase of the rate of growth of money implies that the closed curve
shrinks and eventually disappears and the trajectory collapses to a steady
state around 4% of money growth rate. The 5-periods cycle is still present,
coexisting with the steady state, but the amplitude is smaller and smaller.
Around 9% of money growth rate also the 5-period cycle disappears and
the trajectory collapses to a steady state. This stabilizing role comes from
the negative impact that money holdings have on the accumulation of net
worth. In fact net worth is dened as. [(1  )+ qt]KFt 1   AmFt;t where
 AmFt;t = (1  )mFt 1;t mFt;t. Since the parameter A is increasing with the
ination rate, it is straightforward to infer that the higher the ination rate,
the stronger the negative impact of money holdings on net worth and the
smaller the overall volatility of the macroeconomy. In our simulations, this
result is associated with relatively low ination rates. We are ruling out on
purpose the scenario of hyperination which is usually associated with high
macroeconomic volatility.
As often occurs in nonlinear models, coexistence of attractors and com-
plex dynamics are possible outcomes. An example of multistability situation
has been shown in Figure 1, but it is worth to underline that even more than
two attractors may coexist. For instance, at the same parameter constella-
tion of Figure 1, but with gM = 0:087, the stable xed point and the period
5 cycle coexist with a cyclical 6-pieces chaotic attractor, obtained through
a sequence of period doubling bifurcation of a stable cycle of period 6, ap-
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peared at gM  0:1. In what it follows we describe the emergence of complex
dynamics.
In Figure 3 panel (a) we represent the phase space
 
KFt ; qt

when the
parameter conguration is the the same as in Figure 1 but with a slightly
smaller real interest rate: 1:5% instead of 2%. When ination is high (12%)
the situation is basically the same as in Figure 1. The unstable steady state
coexists with an attracting closed curve and a stable 5-period cycle.
The boundary of the basin of attraction of the closed curve   is very close
to the invariant closed curve (see Figure 3 panel (a)). As the rate of money
growth decrease gradually, the occurrence of a contact bifurcation between
these two invariant sets (the boundary of the basin and the closed curve) can
be detected. Such a bifurcation causes the crisis of the closed invariant curve,
that disappears, leaving the cycle of period 5 as the unique attractor at -
nite distance. As the rate of money growth is further decreased the period-5
cycle undergoes the usual sequence of period doubling bifurcation leading to
the strange attractor depicted in Figure 3 panel (b). The nal shape of this
chaotic attractor is due to a sequence of homoclinic bifurcations associated
with di¤erent saddle cycles coexisting with the attracting cycles. Indeed,
during the period doubling sequence of the period-5 cycle, a cycle of period 3
appears and evolves in a 3-pieces cyclical chaotic attractor, before to disap-
pear through a contact with the boundary of its basin. Obviously, when this
3-band chaotic attractor disappears, innitely many repelling cycles survive
and are responsible of the explosionof the chaotic motion.
When gM reaches 4% a (one-piece) strange attractor appears (see Figure
3 panel (b)). The route to chaotic dynamics, therefore, is based upon a
decreasing rate of growth of money supply. If we reverse the argument it is
clear that by increasing the rate of growth of money supply, the dynamics
simplies from complex to cycles of aperiodic or periodic nature and possibly
to a stable steady state.
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Figure 3: Phase space
 
KFt ; qt

as gM decreases we move from panel (a) to
panel (b) dynamics.
5 Related Literature
We nd it rather instructive to compare the dynamics produced by our frame-
work with the one arising under the baseline setting. The original KM model
with innitely lived agents and linear preferences can be summarized by the
following dynamic system:
KFt =
a
t
KFt 1;
t =
g
 
KFt

R
;
t = qt  
qt+1
R
:
(33)
24
Page 25 of 35
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Comparing (33) with (27) we can emphasize four di¤erences. First, the
law of motion of the farmers landholding is richer in an OLG setting. In fact
dKFt
dKFt 1
OLG = (1  )+ qtt while dK
F
t
dKFt 1
KM = at . The denominator of
the two expressions is the same but the numerator is di¤erent. In particular,
the numerator of
dKFt
dKFt 1
in the OLG case is a weighted average of qt and . 8
Second, by construction money does not appear in the farmers landholding
equation. Third, the present value of the marginal productivity of the land
of the gatherer is equal to the downpayment in KM while it is equal to the
asset price in the present context. Fourth, in an OLG setting we can derive
a sort of quantity theory of money which can be plugged in the farmers
landholding equation.
In KM dynamics is much simpler. The non-trivial steady state is a saddle
point. The authors explore the e¤ects of a sudden change of productivity in
a linearized dynamic system obtaining the usual short run and short lived
responses to a stochastic shock.
In an appendix, KM sketch an overlapping generations variant of their
model along the lines of Blanchards nite horizonframework (Blanchard
1985). This suggestion has been followed by Kasa (1998) who is mainly in-
terested in the welfare analysis and therefore does not focus on the dynamics.
The dynamics of Kasas model, in fact, are not signicantly di¤erent from
those of the original KM framework. The dynamics are richer (but not com-
plex) in the framework put forward by Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) with a
cash in advance and a nancial constraint.
Pintus et al. (2000), along the lines of Woodford (1986) and Grandmont
et al. (1998), explore a model economy populated by two classes of innitely
8There is also a minor but non-negligible di¤erence. The production function of the
farmer in the original setting is (a+ c)KFt 1 where cK
F
t 1 is the fraction of output con-
sisting of "bruised fruit" which is non-tradable and is therefore consumed (due to linear
preferences) while aKFt 1 is tradable output and coincides with the farmers saving. This
distinction is not necessary in the OLG context due to the fact that the utility function is
concave. Therefore we write the production function of the farmer as KFt 1:
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long-living agents in a perfectly competitive environment under perfect fore-
sight. As in our framework, they envisage a class of nancially constrained
agents (the workers) as opposed to a class of unconstrained agents, the cap-
italists. The dynamics generated by the model are characterized by the
transition from local regular to global irregular (chaotic) uctuations in non-
linear dynamic systems in discrete time, a result which generalizes the one
shown by de Vilder (1996) in two-dimensional OLG frameworks.
6 Conclusions
The present paper can be classied, for the sake of simplicity, in a small
but growing body of theoretical literature which emphasizes the long run
real e¤ects of ination in models with nancial market imperfection. We
model an OLG economy with nancing constraints à la Kiyotaki and Moore,
money and bequests. We adopt a Diamond-Samuelson approach, a strategy
so far not followed in the literature, which has explored only the case of a
Blanchard-Yaari framework to model the nancial accelerator with overlap-
ping generations (Kasa, 1998).
In this setting we explore the properties of the dynamic two-dimensional
system generated by the model. The model can generate a wide range of pos-
sible dynamics depending upon parameter congurations. Irregular cyclical
trajectories occur ov r a wide range of plausible parameter constellations.
Moreover, under appropriate but not totally unrealistic congurations, a
chaotic attractor can also appear.
Changes in the rate of growth of money supply have real e¤ects in the
presence of credit frictions. Monetary policy turns out to be non superneu-
tral. When agents face a borrowing constraint, in fact, a redistribution of
real assets can occur due to the interaction between net worth and the rate
of growth of money supply.
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A Optimization
In the following we will denote magnitudes at current (constant) prices with
capital (small) letters.
Lets examine rst the optimization problem of the farmer. The young
farmer (YF) is endowed at birth with bequest AFt . He employs the bequest
and credit Bt to invest in land Qt
 
KFt  KFt 1

and hold money balances
MFt;t. The ow-of-funds constraint of the YF in t therefore is:
Qt
 
KFt  KFt 1

+MFt;t  Bt + AFt :
Dividing by Pt and rearranging we get:
qt
 
KFt  KFt 1

+mFt;t  bt + aFt ; (34)
where qt =
Qt
Pt
, mFt;t =
MFt;t
Pt
, bt =
Bt
Pt
, aFt =
AFt
Pt
.
The YF is nancially constrained. The nancing constraint in nominal
terms can be expressed as follows:
Bt  Qt+1
1 + it
KFt ;
where it is the nominal interest rate. Multiplying and dividing the expression
above by Pt+1 one gets:
bt  qt+1
R
KFt ; (35)
where R := (1 + it) = (1 + t+1) is the real (gross) interest rate and 1+t+1 :=
Pt+1=Pt is the (gross) rate of ination. R is given and constant9.
In t, the YF uses labour and land KFt to produce output y
F
t+1 which will
become available in t+ 1. When old, the farmer employs output and money
balances MFt;t+1 to reimburse debt, consume and leave a bequest. Therefore
9This assumption holds if the current nominal interest rate is adjusted for future ina-
tion as follows it = (R  1) +Rt+1:
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the ow of funds constraint of the old farmer (OF) in t+1 in nominal terms
is:
Pt+1c
F
t;t+1 + A
F
t+1 +Bt (1 + it)  Pt+1yFt+1 +MFt;t+1:
Dividing by Pt+1, recalling that yFt+1 = K
F
t we obtain:
cFt;t+1 + a
F
t+1 +Rbt  KFt +mFt;t+1: (36)
The farmer maximizes (7) subject to (34), (35) and (36). The Lagrangian
is
L =  ln cFt;t+1 + (1  ) ln aFt+1 + FmFt;t + Ft

bt + a
F
t   qt
 
KFt  KFt 1
 mFt;t+
+Ft+1

KFt +m
F
t;t+1   cFt;t+1   aFt+1   btR

+ t
hqt+1
R
KFt   bt
i
:
The FOCs are
(iF )
@L
@cFt;t+1
= 0) 
cFt;t+1
= Ft+1
(iiF )
@L
@aFt+1
= 0) 1  
aFt+1
= Ft+1
(iiiF )
@L
@mFt;t
= 0) F   Ft = 0
(ivF )
@L
@bt
= 0) Ft   Ft+1R = t
From (iF ) and (iiF ) follows that Ft+1 =

cFt;t+1
=
1  
aFt+1
> 0. Hence the
ow of funds of the OF is binding. Taking into account (iF ), from (iiiF )
follows Ft = 
F > 0. Also the ow of funds of the YF is binding. Finally,
we assume that
Ft
Ft+1
> R; (37)
so that from (ivF ) follows that t > 0. Therefore the nancing constraint is
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binding.
Using the FOCs and the constraints it is easy to conclude that cFt;t+1 =
eFt+1 and a
F
t+1 = (1  ) eFt+1 where eFt+1 = (  qt+1)KFt +mFt;t (1 + gM) t+1
are the resources available to the OF. Hence
Ft+1 =

cFt;t+1
=
1  
aFt+1
=
1
eFt+1
:
In words, the marginal utility of consumption is equal to the marginal utility
of bequest and is equal to the reciprocal of the resources available to the OF.
Substituting the values of the Lagrange multipliers into (37) we can
rewrite it as
Ft
Ft+1
= F eFt+1 > R;
or
F >
R
eFt+1
=
R
(  qt+1)KFt +mFt;t+1
 = ^F : (38)
The condition above which implies that t > 0 and the nancing constraint
is binding will be always satised the marginal utility of money must be
su¢ ciently high, i.e. higher than a threshold ^F > 0 for (38) to hold. In the
steady state the condition above boils down to
F >
R
[(  qs)KFs +mFs ]
:
Lets consider now the gatherers optimization problem. The young gath-
erer (YG) is endowed at birth with bequest AGt which he employs to ex-
tend credit Bt, invest in land Qt
 
KGt  KGt 1

=  Qt
 
KFt  KFt 1

and hold
money balances MGt;t. The ow of funds constraint of the YG in t is
Qt
 
KGt  KGt 1

+Bt +M
G
t;t  AGt :
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Dividing by Pt we get
qt
 
KGt  KGt 1

+ bt +m
G
t;t  aGt : (39)
In t, the YG uses labour and land KGt = K   KFt to produce out ut
yGt+1 which will become available in t + 1. When old, the gatherer employs
the output, the repayment of the loan extended when young and money
to consume and leave a bequest. He also has to incur the transaction cost
CMFGt = 'M
G
t;t. Therefore the ow of funds constraint of the OG in t+1 is
Pt+1c
G
t;t+1 + A
G
t+1 + CMF
G
t  Pt+1yGt+1 +Bt (1 + it) +MGt;t+1:
Dividing by Pt+1 and recalling that yGt+1 = G
 
KGt

and
MGt;t+1
Pt+1
= mGt;t+1 we
get
cGt;t+1 + a
G
t+1 + CMF
G
t  G
 
KGt

+ qt+1K
F
t +m
G
t;t+1: (40)
The gatherer maximizes (15) subject to (39) and (40). The Lagrangian
is
L =  ln cGt;t+1 + (1  ) ln aGt+1 + GmGt;t + Gt

aGt   qt
 
KGt  KGt 1
 mGt;t   bt
+Gt+1

G
 
KGt

+ qt+1K
F
t +m
G
t;t+1   cGt;t+1   aGt+1   CMFGt

:
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The FOCs are
(iG)
@L
@cGt;t+1
= 0) 
cGt;t+1
= Gt+1
(iiG)
@L
@aGt+1
= 0) 1  
aGt+1
= Gt+1
(iiiG)
@L
@mGt;t
= 0) G   Gt = 0
(ivG)
@L
@KGt
= 0) Gt+1G0
 
KGt

= Gt qt
(vG)
@L
@bt
= 0) Gt = Gt+1R
From (iG) and (iiG) follows that Gt+1 =

cGt;t+1
=
1  
aGt+1
> 0. Hence the
ow of funds of the OG is binding.
From (vG) follows that
Gt
Gt+1
= R; (41)
so that
Gt = 
G
t+1R =

cGt;t+1
R =
1  
aGt+1
R > 0:
Hence also the ow of funds of the YF is binding.
Using the FOCs and the constraints it is easy to conclude that cGt;t+1 =
eGt+1 and a
G
t+1 = (1  ) eGt+1 where eGt+1 = G
 
KGt

+qt+1K
F
t +m
G
t (1 + gM   ') t+1
are the resources available to the OG. Hence Gt+1 =

cGt;t+1
=
1  
aGt+1
=
1
eGt+1
.
Using the equality above, the From FOC (iiiG) Lagrange multiplier Gt turns
out to be
Gt = 
G:
Substituting the above condition into (41) and recalling that Gt+1 =
1
eGt+1
we
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get
Gt
Gt+1
= GeGt+1 = R:
Comparing the FOCs of the optimization problem of the farmer with
those of the gatherer we can draw the following conclusion
Ft
Ft+1
= F eFt+1 >
Gt
Gt+1
= GeGt+1 = R:
This conclusion was true also in KM but with a di¤erent meaning. In fact
in a KM-ILA economy
Ft
Ft+1
=
1
F
>
Gt
Gt+1
=
1
G
= R. Hence this condition
reected preference heterogeneity.
Finally, from (ivG) and (vG) follows (14)
qt =
G0
 
KGt

R
:
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